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BAD LAWS MAKE HARD CASES*
STATE EX REL ANGVALL V. DISTRICT COURT AND
THE LAW OF ANNULMENT IN MONTANA
Don Molloy
I. INTRODUCTION
In August of 1968 the Montana supreme court considered a
fundamental conceptual notion of the law of annulment when it
heard the case of State ex rel Anguall v. District Court of the Thir-
teenth Judicial District.'
In June of 1966 Jon and Patricia Angvall were married in Sheri-
dan, Wyoming. What transpired between the Angvalls for the next
three months is known only to them. But, in September, they were
involved in an altercation in which Patricia was struck and injured
by an automobile driven by Jon. Their relationship deteriorated and
Patricia filed an action for damages for the injuries she had sus-
tained .2
The normal recourse of litigation was not available to Patricia
as a party plaintiff because she was attempting to sue her own
husband. The prevailing law in Montana has always been that "a
wife may not maintain an action against her husband for personal
injuries upon her by her husband while they were married."'3 Thus,
the only way Patricia could bring the action was to show that she
and Jon were not legally married. In order to do this she sought an
annulment on the ground that her marriage to Jon was void from
the beginning; it violated a Montana statute.'
The statute in question prohibited the remariage of either party
within six months of a judgment of divorce. Jon had been divorced
less than the requisite six months when he and Patricia participated
in the marriage ceremony in Wyoming. Relying on the statutory
declaration that such marriages are void, having no effect what-
soever, Patricia brought the damage action against Jon. Her theory
was that if the annulment were granted it would have the effect of
* It is the opinion of the author that the legal adage "Hard cases make bad law" can
be turned about to state an equally applicable adage, that "Bad laws make hard cases".
1. State ex rel Angvall v. District Court of the Thirtheenth Judicial District, 151 Mont.
483, 444 P.2d 370 (1968).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Revised Codes of Montana, § 48-151 (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947]. "[It
is unlawful for any person who is a party to an action for divorce in any court in this state,
or for any Montana resident who is a party to an action for divorce elsewhere, to marry again
until six months after judgment of divorce is granted, and the marriage of any such person
solemnized before the expiration of six months from the date of the granting of judgment of
divorce shall be void." Repealed Sec. 1, Ch. 63, L 1967.
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a judicial decree stating that no marriage had ever existed between
her and Jon. If no marriage ever existed, she would not be barred
from bringing suit against Jon as she would not fall within the
strictures of the interspousal tort immunity doctrine.
The Montana supreme court, speaking through the Chief Jus-
tice, found no merit in Patricia Angvall's argument. The court pre-
faced a superficial analysis of the problem with this sweeping as-
sumption:
This court sees no reason to distinguish between annulments and
divorces as far as allowing actions subsequent to the termination
of the marriage.5
The court went on to find that "void", as used in the statute
prohibiting marriages6 such as the one between Jon and Patricia
Angvall, interpreted in light of other sections of Montana law,7
meant "void from the time its nullity shall be declared by a court
of competent jurisdiction."I Thus, by the court's interpretation, the
plaintiff could not bring her action. The general rule that a wife
could not sue her husband in tort would be extended to include
persons whose purported marriages were subsequently declared
void.
Even a cursory analysis of the Angvall case leads to the conclu-
sion that the court erred in its interpretation of the statute in ques-
tion. At least two factors contributed to the faulty reasoning and
conclusion in this case.
First, the statute is not carefully drafted. The language used
when the chapter was amended in 19631 was inconsistent with the
language used throughout the rest of the title. The statute declaring
such marriages void was an anomoly in an anachronistic statutory
scheme, something which the legislature apparently realized when
it repealed the statute four years after it was adopted. 0
Secondly, the judiciary has a duty to provide reasoned articula-
tion in the decisions they reach. Assertions should be supported by
authority, authority which should be documented, not merely in-
ferred from the court's inherent powers. In this case the court failed
to probe deeply into the relevant law, and reached a conclusion not
supportable by that law.
5. State ex rel Angvall v. District Court, supra note 1 at 371.
6. R.C.M. 1947, §48-151,.supra note 4.
7. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 48-105, 48-111, 48-201.
8. State ex rel Angvall v. District Court, supra note 1 at 371.
9. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-151, supra note 4.
10. Id.
[Vol. 36
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This note will discuss that relevant law, examining the origins
and development of the law of annulment in Montana."
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
In its early history Montana, like many western territories and
states, looked to California's statutes for guidance on an initial sta-
tutory scheme. Montana's Code Title on Marriage and Annulment
had such roots. The present Marriage and Annulment statutes, and
their predecessors,"2 are verbatim enactments of the California Civil
Code 3 provisions on the same subject. Thus, in order to fully under-
stand the present Montana statutory scheme one must first look
briefly to the Field Code, which is the basic source of the California
statutory scheme,'4 and the common law, which the Field Code
attempted to codify.
A. Common Law
From the Twelfth Century to the middle of the Nineteenth
Century the ecclesiastical courts of England had exclusive jurisdic-
tion in suits to annul.'" The action to annul was not known as annul-
ment but was called divorce a vinculo matrimonni,'8 and was given
for reasons which today are recognized as grounds for a voidable
marriage: for conditions at the time of the marriage which made the
marriage invalid."
The holiness of the matrimonial state is left entirely to the eccle-
siastical law, the temporal courts not having jurisdiction to con-
sider unlawful marriage as a sin, but merely as a civil inconveni-
ence. The punishment therefore, or annulling, of incestuous or
other unscriptural marriages, is the province of the scriptural
courts; which act pro salute animae."1
However, during this historical period the civil courts were not
without power to act in the area of domestic relations. Certain civil
disabilities acted to make the marriage contract"
11. For an excellent statement of the status of annulment in Montana see, Briggs, The
Status of an Annulment in Montana, 4 MONT. L. Rav. 14 (1943).
12. Id. at 21. See also Appendix.
13. WEST'S ANNOTATED CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE § 55 et seq. (West, 1954).
14. WEST'S ANNOTATED CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE § 55 et seq. (West, 1954). See also supra
note 11 at 21.
15. H. CLARKE, LAW OF DoMEsTic RELATIONS, § 3.1 (1968).
16. Id.
17. The grounds for ecclesiastical annulment are generally considered to be consanguin-
ity, affinity, impotence, and pre-contract. Vol. I, CooLEY, COOLEY'S BLACKSTONE, 434 (3d ed.
1884).
18. Id. at 433. Pro Salute Animae means "for the good of the soul."
19. In Montana marriage is still considered a civil contract. See R.C.M. 1947, § 48-101.
1975]
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. . .void ab initio, and not merely voidable; not that they dissolve
a contract already formed, but they render the parties incapable
of forming any contract at all; they do not put asunder those who
are joined together, but they previously hinder the junction. And,
if any persons under these legal incapacities come together, it is
meretricious, and not matrimonial union. ' "
As a result of the historically different jurisdictional sources of
the decree, relationships which could be annulled were classed as
being either voidable or void marriages." The voidable marriage,
which derived from ecclesiastical impediments, was defined as fol-
lows:
A marriage is voidable when in its constitution there is an im-
perfection which can be inquired into only, during the lives of both
the parties, in a proceeding to obtain a sentence declaring it null.
Until set aside, it is practically valid; when set aside, it is rendered
void from the beginning.2
The void marriage was one which was based upon a disability to
contract, a civil impediment.
A marriage is termed void when it is good for no legal purpose, and
its invalidity may be maintained in any proceeding, in any court,
between any parties, whether in their lifetime or after the death
of the supposed husband and wife, and whether the questions arise
directly or collaterally.23
The consequences of a decree in either case were the same. A
declaration that a marriage was "void ' 24 meant that there was no
relationship at all, it was "void from the beginning, 21 5 while a decla-
ration that it was "voidable 26 meant that once the decree was en-
tered it "related back" and established that the marriage never
existed.
20. COOLEY, supra note 17 at 435. Bigamy and want of reason are considered the usual
grounds for a void marriage.
21. H. CLARK, supra note 15 § 3.1 at 120. The void, voidable distinction has also been
stated in terms of declaratory annulment and constitutive annulment. "Theoretically decla-
ratory annulment declares that no marriage ever existed for any purpose. It established in
an official manner what the situation has been all along, i.e. that there never was any
relationship. Constitutive annulment changes the parties' relationship, however. It declares
that because of an impediment or incapacity antedating the purported marriage, that mar-
riage is invalid."
22. BISHOP, BISHOP ON MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION, 107 § 259 (1891).
23. Id. at 107 § 258.
24. "Void" is the language used in R.C.M. 1947, §§ 48-151 and 48-201.
25. "Void from the beginning" is the language used in R.C.M. 1947, §§ 48-105 and 48-
111.
26. "Voidable" is the language used in R.C.M. 1947,.9 48-104.
[Vol. 36
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Although the ecclesiastical courts were never a part of the
American judicial system, the peculiar meaning given the word
voidable carried over as a part of the American common law. The
jurisdictional conflict between the temporal courts and the eccle-
siastical courts was non-existent, so it seems the temporal courts in
this country might well have never recognized the "voidable" mar-
riage at all.2 1 Such was not the case, however, and as the common
law found its roots in the states, the distinction between "void" and
"voidable" became firmly established in the courts and early statu-
tory enactments.
B. Field Code
1. Introduction
It was during the Nineteenth Century that the action for annul-
ment, probably because of the spread of statutes governing annul-
ment, came to be distinguishable from divorce. The distinction
turned on the nature of the two decrees. A divorce decree terminated
for the future a valid, existing marriage. An annulment, whether
granted because a "marriage" was void or because it was voidable,
was a declaration that no marriage cognizable in law ever existed
because of some impediment existing at the time of the marriage
ceremony.28 Of necessity, the two types of decree, divorce and
annulment, were mutually exclusive.20
In pursuance of a state constitutional mandate, the New York
legislature set up commissions to codify the laws of New York. One
of the commissions ultimately headed by David Dudley Field,
drafted the Civil Code, subsequently called the Field Code. There
is no doubt that when the state of New York commissioned the Field
Code,'one of the goals of the Code Commissioners was to eliminate
all the anomalous and anachronistic holdovers found in the common
law."° The commission found one of the holdovers of the common
law to be the concept of a voidable marriage.'
2. Change in Language
It appears that in order to eliminate the legal fiction of "rela-
tion back" in voidable marriages the commission intentionally
27. Briggs, supra note 11 at 17.
28. CLARKE, supra note 15 at 120 § 3.1.
29. See Whealton v. Whealton, 63 Cal. Rptr. 291, 67 Cal.2d 656, 432 P.2d 979, 982 (1967)
where the court noted: "An annulment differs conceptually from a divorce in that a divorce
terminates a legal status, whereas an annulment establishes that a marital status never
existed." Accord, State ex rel Wooten v. District Court, 57 Mont. 517, 189 P. 233 (1920).
30. Briggs, supra note 11 at 21.
31. Id. referring to FIELD CODE (Albany 1865) Introduction XVI.
1975]
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changed the terminology it used when drafting the annulment pro-
visions of the code. Professor Edwin Briggs, in an article about
annulment in Montana, made the following observation about the
framers of the Field Code.
Had they wanted to declare that an annulled marriage was void
ab initio, they almost certainly would have said that it was "voida-
ble", because the latter's meaning in domestic relations was well
established at the drafting of the code. "Void ab initio" was just
what they did not want to say, because they wished to eliminate
the retroactive character of an annulment. "Ab initio" was the
culprit; so they substituted for it a phrase which appeared to mean
the very negation of relation back. They retained the word "void"
because they were in the annulment field, which always talked in
terms of "being void" rather than of a "dissolution". Its retention
recognized the distinguishing character between "annulment" and
"divorce", in that the former was granted for a cause existing at
the time of the marriage; the latter for a cause arising therafter. 2
The Field Code rejected the notion that the consequences of a
voidable marriage and a void marriage were the same, in other
words, a declaration that no marriage ever existed. This position is
manifested by the substitution of the phrase "void from the begin-
ning" for "void", a classification which retained the effect of the
common law annulment decree. More important, however, was the
change evident in the substitution of the phase "void from the time
its nullity is adjudged" for the word "voidable. ' 33 The consequence
of this semantic change was that decrees which formerly "related
back" would henceforth take only prospective effect. The only dif-
fernce between such a decree of annulment and a divorce decree was
the ground upon which each was based.
3. Change in Classification
Aside from semantical changes, the drafters of the Field Code
attempted a major conceptual change in the doctrine of annulment.
This change reflected the fact that there were no ecclesiastical
courts in New York (or anywhere in the United States). This modifi-
cation is evident in the determination of which marriages were clas-
sified as "void from the beginning" and which were considered to
be within the ambit of the new language, "void from the time its
nullity is adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction." The im-
portance of this change lies in the fact that some marriages which
were formerly "voidable" were classified as "void from the begin-
32. Id. at 40.
33. Id. at 22.
[Vol. 36
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ning" while others, previously annullable on the basis of being
"void", were catagorized as being "void from the time its nullity is
adjudged". In other words, incestuous relationships were considered
voidable at common law because of their ecclesiastical origins.
Under the Field Code in effect they became void. In contrast, how-
ever, civil disabilities which were grounds for a court to declare
certain common law "marriages" void were rendered prospectively
void by the Field Code. An example is marriages void due to want
of understanding or marriages void because of lack of consent. Al-
though either ground would have been sufficient to have a marriage
declared void at common law, under the Field Code they were only
void from the time their nullity was declared by a court.
To comprehend the conceptual basis of the Montana annul-
ment statutes, the Field Code modifications and refinements must
be understood. Distinctions based upon the archaic jurisdictional
conflict between the temporal and ecclesiastical courts are superfi-
cial, and are simply inadequate in finding solutions to contemporary
annulment problems.
Thus, the Field Code made two basic changes: (1) The common
law language void was replaced by void from the beginning; and the
term voidable was eliminated and the phrase void from the time its
nullity is adjudged was added.
(2) The common law classification of grounds for annulment
was changed. A ground which would render a "marriage" void at
common law would not necessarily render the same kind of marriage
void from the beginning under the Field Code.
C. Montana Code
Montana's earliest legislation concerning annulment and di-
vorce was a strange amalgam apparently drafted with the intent of
eliminating any distinction between the two.34 "Whether from de-
sign, or ignorance" ' the early legislation had a definite effect on
Montana's law of annulment in that it placed the burden on one
insisting on the common law attributes of annulment to prove them.
These first statutes, the TERRITORIAL LAWS OF MONTANA (the Ban-
nack Code), were replaced by the CIVIL CODE OF 1895, which was
essentially the Field Code as enacted in the California Civil Code.3
The CIVIL CODE OF 1895, though recodified, 37 is basically the present
statutory law in Montana on marriage and annulment.
34. Id. at 20. See f.n. 20 citing the Bannack Code (AcTs, REsOLUTMONS AND MMORALS,
Ty. or MoNT. 1ST LEGis. ASSEMB. 1864).
35. Briggs, supra note 11 at 20.
36. Id. at 21 n. 22.
37. See R.C.M. 1907, 1921, 1935 and 1947; Marriage and Annulment.
1975]
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Because of the heredity of Montana's statutes, the common law
distinctions between void and voidable marriages have little signifi-
cance, if any, in the present law of marriage and annulment. This
becomes apparent upon close examination of the statutory provision
setting forth the grounds for annulment.38 Rather than the common
law jurisdictional classification, one now finds a generic classicia-
tion. There are presently three kinds of annulments granted: (1)
those granted for non-age;39 (2) annulments which are based on
marriages deemed void from the beginning;"° and (3) those mar-
riages classified as voidable." In addition the statute concerning
bigamous marriages has elements which can be categorized within
both of the latter two categories.2
38. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-202 (5729). "A marriage may be annulled for any of the following
causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was under
the age of majority, and such marriage was contracted without the consent of his or her
parents or guardian, or person having charge of him or her; unless, after attaining the age of
majority, such party for anytime freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.
(2) That the former husband or wife of either party was living, and the marriage with
such former husband or wife was then in force.
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason,
freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterward,
with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as
husband or wife.
(5) ThaLthe consent of either party was obtained by force, unless such party afterwards
freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.
(6) That either party was, at the time of marriage, physically incapable of entering into
the married state, and stich incapacity continues and appears to be incurable."
39. This note will not discuss relationships annulled because of non-age. For a thorough
discussion of the effect of annulment based on non-age, see Briggs, supra note 11 at 38.
40. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-105. "Marriages between parents and children, ancestors and
descendants of every degree, and between brothers and sisters of the half as well as the whole
blood, and between nieces and uncles, and between aunts and nephews, and between first
cousins, and between persons, either of whom is feeble-minded, are incestuous and void from
the beginning, whether the relationship is legitimate or illegitimate. (Italicized portion added
by Amend. sec. 1, ch. 6, L. 1919).
41. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-104. "If either party to a marriage be incapable from physical
causes of entering into the marriage state, or if the consent of either be obtained by fraud or
force, the marriage is voidable."
42. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-111. "A subsequent marriage contracted by any person during
the life of a former husband or wife of such person, with any person other than such former
husband or wife, is illegal and void from the beginning, unless:
(1) The former marriage has been annulled or dissolved.
(2) Unless such former husband or wife was absent, and not known to such person to
be living for the space of five successive years immediately preceding such subsequent mar-
riage, or was generally reputed and was believed by such person to be dead at the time such
subsequent marriage was contracted; in either of which cases the subsequent marriage is valid
until its nullity is adjudged by a competent tribunal."
8
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1. Void From the Beginning
Perhaps the most perplexing of the Montana statutes are those
dealing with "marriages" declared void from the beginning. As
noted earlier, incestuous marriages were considered voidable at
common law because the decree of annulment came from the eccle-
siastical courts. However, section 48-105 makes such marriages void
from the beginning." This reclassification coincides with the objec-
tives of the Field Code draftsmen who were seeking to rid the law
of the anomolies of the common law.
The difficulty with section 48-105 lies in the amendment made
in 1919. At that time the following italicized provision was added to
the statute.
Marriages between parents and children, ancestors and descen-
dents of every degree. . . and between persons, either of whom is
feeble-minded, are incestuous and void from the beginning."
(Emphasis added)
Clearly an impaired mental condition or "feeble-mindedness" alone
cannot be the basis for the declaration that a relationship is incen-
tuous. Undoubtedly this amendment was an attempt by the legisla-
ture to make mental incapacity a ground for annulling marriages.
The notion of mental defect as a ground for annulment was
recognized in common law. However, it was not included as a statu-
tory impediment in the code scheme. At common law "idiocy" was
deemed a civil impairment because any person suffering such an
impediment did not have the capacity to contract. Because mar-
riage was considered a civil contract any relationship between a
person of unsound mind and another was void. This accounts for its
location in section 48-105 where a relationship is pronounced void
from the beginning. It most certainly does not account for making
such a relationship incestuous.45
One other section of the Marriage Title, section 48-111, con-
cerns marriages considered void from the beginning." In this sec-
tion, bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning ex-
cept in two cases. First, a previously married person can remarry if
the former relationship has been ended by divorce or annulent. Sec-
ondly, marriage is possible where. the former spouse is absent and
not known to be living by the surviving spouse for at least five years
43. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-105, supra note 40.
44. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-105, supra note 40.
45. Not only is the concept of mental incapacity oddly placed in §48-105, but a further
complication exists in the inconsistency throughout the Title in the language used to refer to
the concept. See R.C.M. 1947, §§ 48-105; 48-202(3); 48-204.
46. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-111, supra note 42.
19751
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preceding the subsequent marriage, or where such former spouse is
belived to be dead. In either case, the subsequent marriage is valid
until its nullity is adjudged by a competent tribunal." This is the
only statute in the Montana code which preserves the prospective
nature of the annulment decree, and then only in certain instances.
2. Voidable
The remaining kind of annullable marriages under the Field
Code scheme are those considered prospectively void. In Montana
these are marriages annullable on grounds of physical incapacity,
force or fraud."8 In this case though, Montana's legislature appar-
ently substituted the common law language of voidable for the Field
Code terminology of "void from the time its nullity is adjudged by
a competent tribunal." As a result of this verbal substitution, the
statute is subject to at least two interpretations. It can be read to
hold that such marriages were "void from the beginning," as the
entry of an annulment decree in a voidable marriage has the effect
of relating back and declaring the marriage was nonexistent for any
purpose. Alternatively, the word voidable in this statute can be
interpreted in light of what was intended by the draftsmen of the
Field Code. This would give due consideration to the semantic and
conceptual changes they made, that is, that the annulment decree
in such cases is prospective. The annulment is effective from the
time it is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction. Given the
history and source of the Montana statutes, the latter seems to be
the more accurate and desirable interpretation. This presents an
obvious dilemma for the court.
3. Procedure
Finally, consideration must be given to the two principal stat-
utes involved in the Angvall case. The first of these is section 48-
201, allowing a judicial declaration of void marriages. It provides
that "Either party to an incestuous or void marriage may proceed
by an action in the district court to have the same so declared. ' 49
This statute provides a procedural device whereby parties to rela-
tionships deemed void under any circumstances can obtain such
declaration by a court.
The problem with section 48-201.is its imprecise use of the
words of art contained in it. The statute provides that either party
to an incestuous or void marriage can seek an annulment decree.
47. Id.
48. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-104, supra note 41.
49. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-201.
[Vol. 36
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However, as noted above, Montana has no void marriages per se,
only marriages which are void from the beginning. The two classifi-
cations differ semantically, not conceptually. In this state marriages
annulled as incestuous or bigamous are void from the beginning, or
in the language of the common law, void. It is likely that in this
instance "incestuous" referred to one kind of marriage void from the
beginning while void was a reference to bigamous marriages.
At common law either party, pro se, could terminate a relation-
ship when a pre-existing condition rendered it void. Because it was
understood there was no marriage for any purpose, there was no
need of a judicial declaration of voidness. Even though this was the
case at common law, there is much authority for the proposition
that although a marriage is absolutely void, and so no judicial de-
cree is necessary, yet
[Als well as for the good order of society as for the peace of mind
of all persons concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
marriage should be ascertained and declared by decree of a court
of competent jurisdiction."
Thus, where controversy is likely to occur it is reasonable to require
a formal annulment proceeding as the exclusive method for estab-
lishing the voidness of a relationship. A judicial proceeding provides
a format for the extensive and formal kind of factual investigation
necessary to insure the interests asserted by the parties, as well as
those of any third party,52 are protected. It is therefore very likely
that this statute was intended to provide a means of litigating the
questions of incest, unsoundness of mind, and bigamy, all of which,
if found to exist, are grounds for a declaration that the relationship
is void from the beginning.
The Montana supreme court had occasion to consider the sig-
nificance of this statute when it considered State v. Crosby.53 The
case involved a prosecution under the former criminal bigamy stat-
ute. 4 The defendant had married while a former spouse was still
living, and this had the effect of rendering the subsequent marriage
50. Briggs, supra note 11 at 53.
51. Id. citing Hahn v. Hahn, 104 Wash. 227, 176 P.3 (1918).
52. At one time a serious consideration in all annulment proceedings was the interest
of third parties, especially the children of annullable marriages. The problem which had to
be resolved was the effect a declaration of annulment had on the legitimacy of such children.
Theoretically, if the decree related back the children were "bastardized". In fact, this is what
happened in many cases. Montana has vitiated the necessity of considering this aspect of
annulment by a statutory declaration that children of relationships subsequently annulled
are legitimate. See R.C.M. 1947, § 48-207. See also, Briggs, supra note 11 for a lengthy
discussion of this problem.
53. State v. Crosby, 148 Mont. 307, 420 P.2d 431 (1966).
54. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-702 repealed by ch. 513 L. 1973.
19751
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void from the beginning. 5 Based on this fact the defense asserted
that there were no grounds for the bigamy charge as the marriage
in question was void from the beginning. The court disagreed and
found
. . ..such voidness must have been declared by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction; such a determination of voidness cannot be made
by the person involved to avoid being charged with a criminal act.-
Although the matter involved in Crosby concerned criminal con-
duct, the reasoning is applicable in any instance involving mar-
riages which are void from the beginning. Self-determination of
voidness is untenable where the interests of another or a third party
are concerned.
4. Amendment
As the historical development of the Montana Marriage and
Annulment Title is traced, it is apparent that a common thread
runs throughout. The consistency lies in the conceptual notions first
set forth in the Field Code's treatment of the common law. It pro-
vides the backbone of the statutory scheme. There have been few
amendments to this basic format, the most notable being the 1919
amendment (making marriages between feeble minded persons in-
cestuous) and the miscegenation statutes57 (later deleted from the
Code).
However, in 1963 the Montana legislature again amended the
code, this time injecting the language which perplexed the Angvall
court. The Title was amended to add the following provision:
It is unlawful for any person, who is a party to an action for divorce
in any court of this state, or for any Montana resident who is a
party to an action for divorce elsewhere, to marry again until six
months after judgment of divorce is granted, and the marriage of
any such person solemnized before the expiration of six months
from the date of granting of judgment of divorce shall be void.U
It appears that the legislature created a new ground for annulment
having no basis in the common law or in the Field Code.
It is necessary to read this statute in the context of the state-
ment of legislative purpose enacted as part of the same chapter:
It is the intent of this act to promote the stability and best interest
of marriage and the family. Marriage is the institution that is the
55. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-111, supra note 42.
56. State v. Crosby, supra note 56 at 311.
57. See R.C.M. 1935, § 5700 et. seq.
58. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-151, supra note 4.
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foundation of the family and of society and the state. The conse-
quences of the marriage contract are more significant to society
than those of other contracts and must be taken into account al-
ways. . .. The impairment or dissolution of the marriage relation
generally results in injury to the public wholly apart from the effect
upon the parties immediately concerned.59
Quite obviously the statute is a moral statement, enacted with little
or no consideration of its suitability as a part of the annulment title.
This was the state of Montana's substantive law of annulment
when the court heard the Angvall case. The common law distintions
of void and voidable served only as a backdrop for understanding
the Field Code. A semantical and conceptual change was mani-
fested both in the statutory language involved and in the classifica-
tions of the kinds of annulment. The legislature had created a new
ground for annulment by requiring a statutory period for divorce
decrees to exist before either party to a dissolved marriage could
remarry. Circumscribing the substantive law is the policy declara-
tion of the state's moral interest in the marital relationship.
III. THE CASE
The case was an original proceeding in which the relator, Jon
Angvall, sought a writ of supervisory control. The trial court had
denied his motion for summary judgment in the action commenced
by his wife in which she sought to establish his liability to her for
damages he allegedly caused. The writ of supervisory control was
issued by the court with an order vacating the trial court's denial
of the motion for summary judgment and entering a new order
granting summary judgment to the relator.6 0
Any law student is early exposed to legal hyperbole where plati-
tudes such as "hard cases make bad law" are embedded in the mind
for perpetuity. Sometimes, however, an appellate court opinion
lends credence to such cliches. The treatment of the issues in
Angvall seems to be one such instance in Montana.
The primary issue in the case concerned the effect to be given
an annulment decree when the relationship being annulled was sta-
tutorily declared void. Given the normal meaning of the word void
in domestic relations it appears there should have been no question
of the effect on the relationship in question. But, given the facts of
the case and the implications a decision in favor of the purported
wife would have had on the doctrine of interspousal immunity, the
court in effect relegated the fundamental issue of the case to
dictum.
59. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-142.
60. State ex rel Angvall v. District Court, supra note 1 at 371.
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The court first reached a conclusion which is apparently based
on a legal syllogism. The major premise of the syllogism is a state-
ment that Montana has never allowed a wife to sue her husband."
The minor premise follows in the statement that a former wife can-
not sue her husband for injuries inflicted during coverture. 2 This,
the court finds, leads to the conclusion that there is no reason to
distinguish between annulments and divorce when the question in-
volves a suit by one former spouse against the other. 3 The conclu-
sion seems to ignore the entire history of common law as well as a
century of statutory enactment.
In considering whether the doctrine or interspousal tort immun-
ity should be appled equally in cases of annulment and divorce, it
is first necessary to assess the policy considerations which are the
basis of that doctrine."4 The arguments in support of interspousal
immunity are basically four: (1) that actions between spouses for
personal torts would disrupt the harmony of the marriage and there-
fore be contrary to public policy; (2) permitting such actions would
create a high risk of collusion and fraud at the expense of the hus-
band's (or wife's) liability insurer; (3) adequate remedies are avail-
able in criminal and divorce courts to settle disputes between
spouses; and, (4) such actions would burden the courts with trivial
suits. Underlying the doctrine is the common law fiction that the
personalities of the parties merge in marriage, and it is impossible
for a party to sue himself.
Considering these factors it is obvious that interspousal im-
munity has no place when considering its effect on an annulled
relationship, since annulment is a declaration that the parties never
were spouses. An early Montana case articulates the precise reason
the notion of interspousal immunity is not applicable to annulment:
Although it appears that up to 1895 the successive legislative as-
semblies of this state did not recognize the fact, there is a clear
distinction between actions for annulment of a marriage on pre-
existing grounds and those for disolution of such a contract for acts
committed after its solemnization. The first . . ..repudiates the
idea that there ever was in fact a marriage . . . and the decree of
the court. . . declares the marriage null and void ab initio, while
the latter recognizes the validity of the marriage and seeks a decree
dissolving the bonds because of the wrongful act of one of the
parties during the existence of the marriage relation.l
61. Id. at 370.
62. Id. at 371.
63. Id.
64. Note, Toward Abolition of Interspousal Tort Immunity, 36 MoNT. L. Rav. -
(1975).
65. State ex rel Wooten v. District Court, 57 Mont. 517, 522, 189 P. 233 (1920).
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Perhaps the court's resolution of the immunity question can be
understood as an unwillingness by the court to allow persons who
have been involved in a personal relationship of trust and confid-
ence to recant when the partnership sours. This conclusion would
have been tenable if the matter had involved a relationship deemed
voidable and the court had interpreted that word in light of its code
origins as a substitute for the language "void from the time its
nullity is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction." That was
not the case. The statute in question in Angvall, section 48-151, was
a declaration that certain marriages were void. The decision seems
to be based on what the court thought was "right",-rather than a
reasoned consideration of the law of annullment.
Having slammed the proverbial court house door in the pur-
ported former wife's face, the court went on to consider whether or
not she was entitled to an annulment. The statute in question made
marriages within six months of a divorce void. The facts clearly
indicated that Patricia Angvall was entitled to an annulment. The
court's problem was reconciling the statutory declaration that mar-
riages such as hers were void, with the doctrine of interspousal im-
munity.
The court found that former section 48-151 had to be read in
the context of other sections within the same title. It looked to the
sections of the title which declared certain marriages "void from the
beginning",." The language used in these particular sections was a
semantical change implemented when the Field Code was drafted.
Conceptually, a declaration that a marriage was void from the
beginning was identical in effect to a common law declaration that
it was void. The court failed to make this distinction, observing:
On the other hand, former section 48-151.did not say that mar-
riages within six months of a divorce are void from the beginning,
only that they are void."7
Turning its attention to the chapter on annulment, the court
further confused the issue by its reading of section 48-201.1s It should
be remembered that this statute was enacted to provide a proce-
dural device by which a party to a marriage "void from the begin-
ning" could secure such a declaration by a court. On the basis of
these two statutes, the court reached its conclusion:
66. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 48-105 supra note 40, and 48-111 supra note 42.
67. State ex rel Angvall v. District Court, supra note 1 at 371.
68. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-201. "Either party to an incestuous or void marriage may proceed
by an action in the district court, to have the same so declared." Though this statute is
treated as a part of the annulment chapter, its textual location is purely coincidental. When
the code was adopted in 1895 § 48-201 was not a part of the annulment chapter but was a
separate article setting forth a judicial procedure to determine void marriages. Vol 2. Civ.
Code (1895), tit. I, ch. I, art. HI, § 100.
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In view of section 48-201, we hold that the word void in former
section 48-151 means that the marriage should be void from the
time its nullity shall be declared by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion. 9
This conclusion is tantamount to a judicial declaration that
void as used in domestic relations, carries the same meaning that
voidable has in other areas of the law. As the dissenting opinion
notes:
The Majority has, in effect, construed the statutory declaration
that such marriage is "void".to mean that it is "voidable". In so
doing, public policy prohibiting this marriage has been rendered
meaningless and illusory by making its vitality dependent upon
the will of the parties."0
This result is diametrically opposed to a conclusion previously
reached by the Montana court in dealing with a legislative declara-
tion that certain marriages are void. Deciding In Re Takahasi's
Estate," the court had to consider the effect of a statute which
declared that marriages between caucasians and persons of Japa-
nese ancestry were void. There the court held
Neither time nor circumstance could remove the legal objection
and obstacle thereto; nor could the marriage status afterward re-
sult from such cohabitation as followed. The marriage was void
and ineffectual for any lawful purpose in this state. It is open to
collateral attack in any proceeding wherein the question of its
validity is raised, whether before or after the death of either or both
of the parties. The marriage was wholly non-existent, and there
was no occasion ever for any proceeding to have it annulled.72
(Emphasis added)
The statute interpreted by the court in Angvall involved essen-
tially the same principle as that in Takahasi's Estate: The statute
in both cases was a legislative declaration that a relationship is void,
based upon principles having no foundation in common law. These
''marriages are declared void because they violate a declared policy
of the state. '73 As the court had stated in an earlier divorce decision:
The legislature has imposed methods recognized under which the
bonds of matrimony are consumated and at the same time it has
imposed the methods under which those bonds may be terminated.
For us to read into the statute something that is not there would
69. State ex rel Angvall v. District Court, supra note 1 at 371.
70. Id. at 372.
71. In Re Takahasi's Estate, 113 Mont. 490, 129 P.2d 217 (1942).
72. Id. at 500.
73. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-142.
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be in effect a judicial amendment thereto. Such authority has not
been committed to us.7'
It is arguable that the Angvall court read something into former
sections 48-151 and 48-201.which wasn't there.
IV. CONCLUSION
When old rules are discarded it is inevitable that a new genera-
tion of principles will evolve. A court is burdened with the duty to
provide a reasoned analytical approach in developing these new
princples. On occasion, though, it appears that the duty is shrugged
and that reason and principle give way to what appears to be reac-
tion. The conclusions on such occasions, if not inimical to the integ-
rity of the system, at least deprive it of its predictable character.
The statute interpreted in Angvall has since been repealed, so
it is unlikely the particular question involved will again come before
the court. The court's interpretation of "void" however, will linger
on and undoubtedly will be used as authority in subsequent annul-
ment cases. Its effect will probably be most acutely felt in litigation
concerning the incidents of marriage such as alimony and statutory
compensation benefits. 5 Progressive writers in the domestic rela-
tions field have urged that the distinctions between divorce and
annulment be abolished.7" The effect of Angvall may well be that
some of these distinctions have been abolished in Montana." There-
fore, it is time for the legislature to take a careful look at Montana's
Marriage and Annulment title and rid it of the confusing language
which runs throughout.
74. Reed v. Reed, 130 Mont. 409, 414, 304 P.2d 590 (1956).
75. See Santelli v. Folsom, 165 F.Supp. 224 (1958) (Social Security benefits); also
Sefton v. Sefton, 45 Cal.2d 872, 291 P.2d 439 (1955) (Alimony).
76. CLARKE, supra note 15 at 143 § 3.6.
77. When a divorce decree is granted there is a declaration that the relationship has
ended and the status of the parties is changed. Angvall can be read to have the same effect
when an annulment decree is granted.
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APPENDIX A
CONCEPTUAL DEVELO ENT OF ANNULMENT IN MONTANA
1. Eliminate cannn law, uanmliee,
a. moid fro= the heginning"
substituted for 'Void-
b. "void from the time its
nullity is declared as such
by a court of competent
Jurisdiction" substituted for
"voidable-. DOES AWAY WITH
THE BANNACK STATUTES CNETO EAINRC
REVISED CODES OF MONTANA
• VOID FROM THE BEGINNINO B. VOIDABLE (548-104)
1. Prior marriage (540-111) 1. Phyeioal incapacity
2. Consanguinity A Affinity 2. Force or Fraud. VOID
(S48-105) VOIDABLE at AT COMMON LAW.
1919 Amendment---Feeble-
Mindedness
3. 1963 Amendment---marriage
within six months of diVorce
is VOid ($48-lSi) NO COMOOSN
LAW BASIS. Repealed 1967.
a . e. at.nsship void. 
HOT
REQUIRED AT COMN LAW.
STATE ex rel ANGVALL V. DISTRICT COURT
"Voido in 548-151 in view of 548-201 mans void
fram the time its nullity shall be declared by
a court of competent jurisdiction.
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